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2 abstract
This paper examines the existence of the political budget cycle (PBC) at the local 
unit level in Croatia. The research was focused on a sample of 19 county centres, 
the City of Zagreb and Pula in the period from 2002 to 2011. During that time 
three parliamentary (in 2003, 2007 and in 2011) and two local elections (in 2005 
and in 2009) were held and all the results are calculated at the level of the selected 
cities. The results do not confirm the existence of opportunistic PBCs, either when 
the analysis takes in all five elections or when it considers only the parliamentary 
polls. They do however indicate the restructuring of total expenditures based on 
second-best strategies and institutional constraints. Analysis of local elections 
alone indicates the existence of Rogoff’s model of information asymmetry. The 
paper also presents various theoretical models of the PBC together with a survey 
of empirical research regarding the existence of PBCs in the developed, transiti-
onal and developing countries. 
Keywords: political-budget cycles, elections, dynamic panel data analysis 
1 introduction
In the context of the path transition has taken in Croatia since the 1990s the pro-
blem with budget deficits at all government levels (national, regional and local) 
indicates the importance of analysing political constraints in the processes of both 
budget and economic policy formulation and implementation. Political constraints 
are the result of heterogeneity of preferences among economic agents as defined 
by public choice theory (politicians, voters, bureaucrats and interest groups) and 
their mutually confronting interests. They arise due to self-interest on the behalf 
of incumbents and their re-election motives. In other words, they are shown in a 
sub-optimal allocation of budget resources and in the creation of budget deficits. 
Thus, a wider perception of these constraints can be beneficial both for economic 
policy makers as well as for researchers, voters and other economic agents as de-
fined by public choice theory. Additionally, the size and the influence of the state 
in the economy (measured as the percentage of GDP that is distributed through 
political decisions) is of too great an importance to keep the focus strictly on the 
analysis of market decisions and to claim that politicians and their preferences are 
exogenous.  
The political-budget cycle (PBC) has been vigorously studied in the literature, 
from  both  theoretical  (e.g.  Rogoff  and  Siebert,  1988;  Rogoff,  1990;  Shi  and 
Svensson, 2002; Drazen and Eslava, 2006) and empirical aspects (e.g. Persson 
and Tabellini, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2004; Alt and Lassen, 2006; Schneider, 
2010) with various country samples and methodological instruments. Despite the 
importance of political constraints in the formulation and implementation of opti-
mal economic policies, PBCs in Croatia represent an area of research where scie-
ntific empirical literature has been rather silent, especially at the local level.v
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3 PBC models represent one of the most active branches of research within the new 
(positive) political economy (NPE). Due to their theoretical foundations and em-
pirical validation they have almost entirely replaced previous research focused on 
political business cycles. PBC models can be defined as periodical fluctuations in 
fiscal policy induced by the electoral cycle. With respect to the model, fluctuations 
can take the form of a budget deficit or a change in the magnitude (increase) and 
composition of public spending or a reduction in public revenues. From this origi-
nates the primary goal of this paper, namely to establish which of the theoretical 
political budget cycle models is suitable for Croatia.
The main hypothesis of the paper is that in Croatia PBCs do exist at the municipal 
level and an additional hypothesis is that any party ideology shared at the munici-
pal and national level is likely to be visible in public spending. More directly, 
public spending will rise if municipal and national incumbents share the same 
party ideology. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no scientific empi-
rical paper in the domestic literature that has tested the existence of PBCs at the 
municipal level. The fundamental contribution of this paper to the existing litera-
ture is in providing an empirical analysis of the results of combined parliamentary 
and local elections, and an analysis of separately held local and separately held 
parliamentary elections on a sample of Croatian cities.  
Results that refer to joint parliamentary and local elections and to solely parlia-
mentary elections do not confirm the main and the additional hypothesis. In ele-
ction years, total spending decreases, which results in a lower budget deficit. Due 
to the institutional limitations set on the size of public debt at the local level, in-
cumbents use opportunistic manipulations within public spending items. In other 
words, they cut capital and increase current spending. The analysis of solely local 
elections confirms the existence of PBCs at the municipal level and suggests that 
Rogoff’s model of asymmetric information is optimal. The increase of the budget 
deficit in election years in combination with an increase in the average number of 
employees in the local bureaucracy and budgetary users corresponds with the the-
oretical predictions of the stated model. Both results indicate opportunistic beha-
viour on the part of the incumbent and the rent-seeking role of the local bureau-
cracy in the election process.
The article is organised as follows. The next section presents basic terms from the 
NPE and from public choice theory (PCT) that serve as the common ground on 
which both political business cycle and PBC models were developed. Section 3 
presents three key PBC models: asymmetric information, moral hazard and the 
model of incumbent asymmetric preferences (pork barrel cycles), which consti-
tute the theoretical basis of the empirical analysis. A survey of the empirical lite-
rature on PBC models in developed, transition and developing countries is prese-
nted  in  section  4.  Data,  methodology  and  the  empirical  results  obtained  are v
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4   presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6 together with 
the directions that future research might take. 
2 the new political economy and public choice theory
The roots of the NPE as a research area can be traced to the theory of macroeco-
nomic policy (Lucas’ critique), rational choice theory and public choice theory 
(PCT) (Persson and Tabellini, 2000:2-3). Although founded on PCT grounds (me-
thodological individualism1 and utility maximisation) the NPE is primarily intere-
sted in the analysis of the economic effects of politics. In other words, the NPE 
takes the current institutional framework as a given constraint in the optimisation 
process without having any explicit intention of changing it. 
Drazen (2000:7) argues that actual policies are often quite different from optimal 
policies due to technical, informational and political constraints. The NPE ex-
plains the choice of policies and thus economic outcomes that differ from optimal 
policies, and the outcomes those policies would imply. In this light the two fol-
lowing propositions are important for the NPE. First, heterogeneity and conflicts 
of interests among economic agents are a necessary condition for political con-
straints to exist. And second, the effect of politics on economics follows from the 
mechanisms by which these conflicts are resolved. It is the latter that is the key 
focus of the NPE.
The economic effects of political behaviour, within the existing literature, are di-
vided between political business cycle and the PBC. Both theoretical and empiri-
cal researches into these phenomena stem from PCT. As an interdisciplinary rese-
arch area, PCT unites theoretical paradigms of economics and political science 
and applies it in the analysis of behaviour of key economic agents within the the-
ory itself (politicians, voters, bureaucrats and interest groups). PCT can be defined 
as a special form of ‟economic imperialism”2, as an economic theory of politics or 
based on Buchanan (2005:8) as ‟politics without romance”. PCT is based on three 
assumptions: of self-interest, exchange and methodological individualism (Udehn, 
2003:154). From these assumptions follows the behaviour of economic agents 
that aim to maximize their utility with respect to the given constraints.
Elections play a twofold role in this process. First, they include politicians and 
their preferences in economic models which in turn make them ‟richer” and more 
real. In that way, by incorporating the interactions of all economic agents, the 
economic  models  include  conflicts  due  to  incompatible  preferences.  Finally, 
through the election process, voters decide on the collective action (i.e. its start/
end, intensity, etc.). 
1 The term highlights that it is the individual and his (rational) choices that are in the centre of the analysis. 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) suggest that methodological individualism implies the idea that all socio-
economic explanations should be sought at the level of individual economic agent.
2 The term is derived in the works of Tullock (1972), Stiegler (1984) and Udehn (2003).v
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5 The relationship between economic agents within PCT is best described through 
the agent-principal model in which preferences, in most cases, do not coincide. 
For instance, the agent (politician) can trick his principal (voter) due to informa-
tion asymmetry prior, during or even after the election period. Once the elections 
are held, economic agents start negotiating and voting on various public policies. 
The policies chosen are then delegated to bureaucrats who are in charge of imple-
menting them. During this whole process, interest groups apply pressure in order 
to bring about an outcome of the collective action that is in their favour.
McLean (1997:39, 41) analyses politicians as entrepreneurs that provide specific 
public goods and as ‟ideological entrepreneurs”. The first are responsible for pro-
ducing and trading public goods, but are also characterised by their tendency to 
trade private goods also. It is their role as entrepreneurs that represents the basis 
for their re-election aspirations in front of the electorate. On the other hand we see 
‟ideological entrepreneurs” who are genuinely interested in the contents of poli-
tics and the political. They ensure public goods regardless of the free rider pro-
blem. ‟Ideological entrepreneurs” do not expect to be compensated and consider 
their work as their calling.
Voters represent rational and self-interested economic agents that can be compa-
red to consumers in the market. Their act of voting serves as a means to maximize 
their utility function. The biggest problem in the analysis of voter behaviour is that 
voters actually do not know how to vote for their own interests. The cost of acqui-
ring information, in a (pre)election period, is too high for a rational homo econo-
micus. Additionally, if information does not exist or is asymmetric the optimal 
strategy for every voter is to act as a rational ignoramus.3 In such a case, a rational 
voter ignores all pre-election events and votes ideologically. In return, it is exactly 
the combination of rational ignorance, ideological voting and the so called ‟pro-
blem of full supply”4 that stimulates politicians in their sub-optimal behaviour.
According to Niskanen’s model of bureaucracy, bureaucrats will aim to maximize 
their own budget due to the fact that they cannot maximize profit (McLean, 
1997:100-101). Since they are monopolistic suppliers of their own goods this re-
presents the only way in which they can ensure compensation through various 
privileges: bigger offices, higher salaries, public reputation, etc. Most theoreti-
cians of public choice claim that during this process bureaucrats will tend to pro-
duce more than the politicians (and probably voters) would like them to do or that 
they will do it at a higher price (Lemieux, 2004:27). The literature also emphasises 
the role of information asymmetry or the power of bureaucracy to determine the 
agenda (Mueller, 2003:333, 342-343).
3 But rational ignorance is also asymmetric, with the essential role of interest groups and incumbents in that 
process.
4 The situation in which none of the programs offered to voters fully reflects their preferences.v
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6 Interest groups represent groups of individuals with common interests that con-
duct collective actions: caveats, lobbying, financing political party campaigns, 
etc. Their goal is to influence the outcome of collective actions that very often 
have the characteristics of a public good. Their activities rarely come to the tight 
bonding to those political options that would, in their opinion, best represent their 
interests in exchange for their support in the elections. Promoting the joint interest 
of their members, at the expense of others, is the main reason why interest groups 
enter into politics.
3 political budget cycles
Political decisions have economic outcomes that are visible in movements of eco-
nomic variables and instruments. Political business cycle models represent elec-
tion driven cycles in (macro)economic variables: unemployment rates, inflation 
rates and production. With respect to the rational expectations hypothesis and in-
cumbents’ motives (opportunistic vs. partisan) the existing political business cycle 
models can be divided into four large groups: adaptive opportunistic, adaptive 
partisan, rational opportunistic and rational partisan political business cycle mo-
dels (Alesina, 1988:16). Drazen (2000:259) supplemented Alesina’s division with 
‟Hibb’s model of changing objectives”, which represents a synthesis of previous 
models in an environment characterised by rational expectations. 
PBC models represent a periodical fluctuation in governmental fiscal policy indu-
ced by the cyclicality of elections (Shi and Svensson, 2003:67), that is, an incre  ase 
in public spending (total or in certain items), budget deficit creation and a decr  ease 
in public revenues in election year. The key difference between PBC and political 
business cycle models is that the former focus on the analysis of instruments that 
are under the direct control of politicians. Various PBC models study the   effects of 
political pressures aimed at increasing public spending and creating budget defi-
cits. Just as in the political business cycle models, political pressures can take two 
forms: opportunistic and partisan. In the first case, opportunistic politicians can 
increase either total spending or individual budget items aimed at certain groups 
in order to improve their chances of re-election. Alternatively, incumbents might 
be beholden to a partisan constituency that gains from certain kinds of expendi  ture 
(Lohmann, 2006:534).
According to Mueller’s ethical voter hypothesis that focuses on economic vo  ting, 
the voter has an objective function, which he tries to maximize, with the two 
  following variables: personal and social welfare.5 In PBC models, voters value 
only personal, direct benefit from governmental programmes. Since information 
is asymmetric, their voting is labelled as rational retrospective, meaning that it 
5 Mueller (2003:298-299) denotes these two terms as egotropic and sociotropic variables in the objective func-
tion that the voter is trying to maximize. Egotropic variables measure voter expectations regarding the effect 
of the government’s policies on the voter’s own income, employment status, and so on. Sociotropic variables 
measure voter expectations regarding the effect of the government’s policies on the economy at large, that is, 
on the welfare of all citizens.v
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7   follows   from the incumbents’ observed results during their term in the office 
  (Alesina   et al., 1997). In this way, voters are trying to determine exactly how 
much the incumbents contribute to their objective utility functions. In so doing, a 
rational voter will react to pre-election manipulation, e.g. when an incumbent tries 
to signalise its high level of competence through increased public spending and 
lower taxes or when it changes the structure of public spending in the (pre)elec-
tion period. Under these conditions, the incentives faced by the politicians to ma-
nipulate budget items and to create budget deficits primarily depend on the fiscal 
prefere  nces of voters (whether they prefer ‟high spending” or ‟low spending” 
politicians) and on the transparency of the budget process.
Shi and Svensson (2003:69-70) distinguish two types of PBC models: signal mo-
dels (adverse selection-type models), that are based on asymmetric information 
regarding the politicians’ level of competence, and models based on moral hazard. 
Drazen and Eslava (2006:16) expand this division with their own model of incum-
bents’ asymmetric preferences (pork barrel cycles) in which alongside the overall 
level of expenditures one also observes the structure of expenditures among vo-
ters.
The key reason for analysing PBC models is in their empirical confirmation, 
which is stronger in the case of macroeconomic instruments than in that of macro-
economic results (Drazen, 2000:242-244). At the same time, empirical results cle-
arly indicate that the manipulation of instruments by incumbents who wish to 
improve their re-election chances through opportunistic economic policies is 
more evident in the case of fiscal than in the case of monetary policy (Snowdon 
and Vane, 2005:536). This follows from Rogoff’s concept of conservative central 
banker whose primarily goal is price stability (Snowdon and Vane, 2005:552). 
Cycles that arise are shorter and have lower intensity, but the empirical advantage 
of PBC models is that they permit research into cycles at both national and local 
levels.
3.1 model based on asymmetric preferences
This model is based on signals that incumbents have sent to their electorate in the 
form of lower taxes and/or higher expenditures. The goal of incumbents in the 
(pre)election period is to present themselves as more competent then they really 
are. In that way, they create the illusion that they can provide a given level of pu-
blic services with lower levels of public revenues.6
The basic argument of the model is that voters prefer public expenditures, but 
constantly undervalue their tax costs, i.e. they suffer from ‟fiscal illusions”. The 
problem increases if the costs are postponed so voters support incumbents who 
6 Rogoff and Siebert (1988:2) define competence as the minimum amount of public revenues needed to en  sure 
the given levels of public services.v
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8 can provide high levels of public expenditures, financed through public debt, and 
remove those who cannot. 
3.1.1 Rogoff and siebert Pbc model 
The PBC model by Rogoff and Siebert in 1988 assumes that each politician has a 
competence level (high or low) which is only known to him and not to the electo-
rate. As a consequence, during elections, voters form their rational expectations 
based on observable current fiscal policy outcomes. A high-type incumbent will 
attempt to signal his type by engaging in expansionary fiscal policy, which leads 
to a pre-election budget deficit. A low-type incumbent will avoid this manoeuvre. 
The reason for this originates from the theoretical predictions of the model, in 
which both types of politicians put equal weights on re-election and social welfare. 
Elections are held every two years and the incumbent provides a well-known, fi-
xed level of public services financed through distortive (e.g. bond issuance) and 
non-distortive tax, depending also on the competence level of the incumbent (Ro-
goff and Siebert, 1988:5). Incumbents’ competence is shown in the level and the 
structure of public revenues and it follows an MA(1)7 process indicating that com-
petence will not be signalised outside the election period. Voters vote taking into 
account the increase/decrease of their individual utility functions. Since they are 
all identical we are observing a representative voter who will, other things being 
equal, prefer a high-type incumbent who can finance public goods solely through 
non distortive taxes that do not further decrease voters’ income level.
At the beginning of each election period, voters receive a signal from the incum-
bent in the form of a non-distortive tax. Only after the elections are held do voters 
infer the second signal, which is loss of income (e.g. costs of debt financing). This 
enables incumbents to signalise a higher level of competence, i.e. to provide more 
public goods for a given level of (non-distortive) taxes, in the election period 
through budget deficit creation (Rogoff and Siebert, 1988).
3.1.2 Rogoff’s Pbc model 
In Rogoff’s PBC model of 1990 public goods are divided into ‟consumption” and 
‟investment” goods. Pre-election manipulations are shown in the structure of pu-
blic expenditures that decreases capital expenditures for ‟investment” goods and 
increases transfers and current spending. The model also incorporates an ego rent 
for the incumbent that represents a non-monetary benefit for holding office (e.g. 
honour), but which ‟does not exclude a possibility of rent seeking behaviour” 
(Rogoff, 1990:2).
7 MA(1) denotes a moving-average model which is conceptually a linear regression of the current value of the 
series against current and previous (unobserved) white noise error terms or random shocks. v
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9 According  to  Rogoff’s  1990  model  an  incumbent’s  competence  follows  the 
MA(1) process and we analyse the public goods production function, but in per 
capita amounts. The production of public goods depends on the level of (non-di-
stortive) tax and incumbent’s (administrative) competence,8 indicating that a com-
petent incumbent is able to provide a given level of public goods at a lower level 
of taxes. Since the level of taxes and the amount of public ‟consumption” goods 
can be inferred by voters in time period t, which is the election period, the incen-
tive for the incumbent to increase the amount of public ‟consumption” goods is 
evident. The exact level of the incumbent’s competence will be clear in time pe-
riod t + 1, once the production of public ‟investment” goods is noted. Thus in the 
election period voters do not know whether the increased amount of goods and 
services is a sign of higher competence or a result of a fiscal manipulation. 
3.2 model based on moral hazard
In a PBC model based on moral hazard it is assumed that neither the electorate nor 
the politician can observe the politician’s competence contemporaneously. A com-
petent politician is defined by their ability to produce public goods without raising 
taxes. The easiest way to do this is through short-term excess borrowing, which 
voters infer only after the elections. Thus all politicians, regardless of their level 
of competence, will incur excessive pre-election budget deficits.  
The supply of public goods depends on the incumbent’s level of competence, 
taxes, excessive short-term borrowing and the cost function of public debt. The 
incumbent’s competence also follows the MA(1) process, implying that the same 
level of competence does not last more than two periods. Exactly after these two 
periods, the elections are held. 
At the beginning of period t incumbent decides on the level of taxes and excess 
short-term borrowing. During the observed time period there is shock in the in-
cumbent’s level of competence. The result of this shock is the ex ante uncertainty 
of the incumbent of his ability to convert revenues into public goods, i.e. his own 
competence. Since the elections are held at the end of the period, voters’ ability 
correctly to evaluate the incumbent’s decisions depends on the level of informa-
tion. A share of the informed voters σ will know exactly the levels of taxes, public 
debt and public goods at the time of the election. A share of the uninformed voters   
(1 − σ)will only have information on variables that directly affect their level of 
utility (public goods and tax levels). Thus it follows that incumbents will more 
easily manipulate fiscal instruments when the level of uninformed voters is bigger. 
The model implies that countries with lower levels of voter awareness and higher 
‟ego” rents will have higher levels of public debt, but also that ‟ego” rents will 
decrease with the development of institutions and higher transparency of budget 
process (Shi and Svensson, 2006:1376-1377).
8 Rogoff (1990:23) identifies competence of politicians with the level of administrative intelligence quotient.v
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10 3.3 model of incumbent’s asymmetric preferences:  
pork barrel cycle
Drazen and Eslava (2006) developed a PBC model in which incumbents influence 
voters by targeting government spending to specific group of voters at the expense 
of other voters or other expenditures. Using targeted spending, aimed at more 
‟useful” voters, enables electoral manipulation with no effect on total spending 
and/or budget deficit. This is especially important for so called ‟old” democracies, 
where empirical research confirms that voters are ‟fiscal conservatives” who pu-
nish incumbents who generate budget deficits (Eslava, 2011:22). In the model, 
voters exactly know how the increase of spending is financed. Their only interest 
is in whether this structure of spending will continue to favour them once the 
elections are over. Total spending takes the three following forms in the model: 
 – geographically concentrated investment projects (a more narrow definition 
of ‟pork barrel spending”),
 – expenditures and transfers targeted to specific demographic groups,
 – tax cuts benefiting certain sectors.
A key innovation that enables the creation of PBCs is so called ‟policy” prefere-
nces of the incumbent over different voting groups that are not revealed to the 
electorate. Voters try to detect them by monitoring public goods spending over 
regions in the previous term. At the same time it is assumed that the incumbent has 
unobserved  preferences  concerning  groups  of  voters  or  types  of  expenditure, 
which have some persistence over time. Monitoring the level of expenditures on 
public goods in one region enables the voter to infer the importance of that region 
in the time period t (election year) for the incumbents and their likely preferences 
in the future. In other words, a voter can rationally evaluate all future benefits if 
the incumbent remains in office (Drazen and Eslava, 2006).
4 survey of empirical research  
  on the political budget cycle
This part of the paper presents 8 studies which empirically test the existence of 
PBC in OECD countries. All the papers are theoretically founded either on the 
asymmetric information or the moral hazard basis. Methodologically, research has 
been conducted via a static or a dynamic panel model. Six studies have been con-
ducted at the local and the remaining two at the national level. The results in four 
studies confirm the existence of PBCs, while research undertaken by Rose (2006) 
indicates that PBCs are conditional on institutional constraints within the obser-
ved federal states of USA. Studies on federal states in the former West Germany 
yield interesting results. Seitz (2000) and Schneider (2010) reject the hypothesis 
that PBCs exist, while Galli and Rossi (2002) confirm it. Table 1 contains all the 
mentioned studies and lists: author names, methodology, variables and conclu-
sions.v
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t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
t
a
x
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
,
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
,
 
i
n
fl
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
w
a
g
e
R
o
g
o
f
f
’
s
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
P
B
C
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
fi
r
m
e
d
,
 
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
t
i
c
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
fi
r
m
e
d
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
r
i
s
e
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
 
o
f
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
p
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
 
m
a
n
i
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
s
’
 
c
h
a
n
c
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
M
a
u
r
e
l
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
:
 
2
5
 
E
U
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
,
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
 
a
n
d
 
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
,
 
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
5
F
i
x
e
d
-
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
m
o
n
e
y
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
M
3
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
i
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
‟
o
l
d
”
 
a
d
 
‟
n
e
w
”
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
.
K
l
a
š
n
j
a
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
:
 
2
5
 
p
o
s
t
-
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
 
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
6
F
i
x
e
d
-
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
‟
l
o
c
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
g
o
o
d
s
”
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
o
r
 
g
e
o
g
r
a
 
p
h
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
e
d
)
 
(
%
 
G
D
P
)
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
 
o
f
 
1
.
0
5
%
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
0
.
8
2
%
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
0
.
6
3
%
 
o
n
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
0
.
4
5
%
 
i
n
 
a
 
p
o
s
t
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
a
r
i
a
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
 
c
y
c
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
i
m
u
l
t
a
n
e
o
u
s
 
c
u
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
a
x
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
V
u
č
k
o
v
i
ć
 
(
2
0
1
0
)
:
 
 
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
,
 
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
8
T
i
m
e
 
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
(
%
 
G
D
P
)
O
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
t
i
c
 
c
y
c
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
(
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
l
a
s
t
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
t
o
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
fi
r
s
t
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
)
.
S
c
h
u
k
n
e
c
h
t
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
:
 
 
2
4
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
7
3
-
1
9
9
2
F
i
x
e
d
-
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
T
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
p
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.v
e
l
i
b
o
r
 
m
a
č
k
i
ć
:
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
c
y
c
l
e
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
1
)
 
1
-
3
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
13
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
G
o
n
z
a
l
e
z
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
:
 
M
e
x
i
c
o
,
 
1
9
5
7
-
1
9
9
7
T
i
m
e
 
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
c
o
n
fi
r
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
t
i
c
 
P
B
C
 
m
o
d
e
l
.
P
e
r
s
s
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
T
a
b
e
l
l
i
n
i
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
:
 
6
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
8
F
i
x
e
d
-
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
T
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
/
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
,
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
T
a
x
e
s
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
i
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
c
i
e
s
,
 
b
u
t
 
o
n
l
y
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
c
u
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
a
x
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
p
o
s
t
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
K
h
e
m
a
n
i
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
:
 
1
4
 
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
,
 
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
4
T
i
m
e
 
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
E
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
i
s
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
x
e
s
,
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
i
n
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
.
B
r
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
D
r
a
z
e
n
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
:
 
6
8
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
6
0
-
2
0
0
1
F
i
x
e
d
-
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
(
%
 
G
D
P
)
B
o
t
h
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
l
a
b
e
l
l
e
d
 
a
s
 
‟
n
e
w
”
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
c
i
e
s
.
D
r
a
z
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
E
s
l
a
v
a
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
:
 
C
o
l
u
m
b
i
a
 
(
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
,
 
1
9
9
2
-
2
0
0
0
G
M
M
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
d
e
b
t
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
a
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
.
 
S
h
i
 
a
n
d
 
S
v
e
n
s
s
o
n
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
:
 
 
8
5
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
7
5
-
1
9
9
5
G
M
M
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
 
(
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
d
e
fi
c
i
t
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
1
%
 
i
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
w
e
a
k
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
B
r
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
D
r
a
z
e
n
 
(
2
0
0
9
)
:
 
 
7
4
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
7
0
-
2
0
0
3
L
O
G
I
T
B
A
L
C
H
_
t
e
r
m
 
(
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
/
G
D
P
 
r
a
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14 A survey of empirical studies of the existence of PBCs in the sample of transition 
and developing countries encompasses 13 studies, out of which 10 confirm the 
existence of PBCs. Methodologically, research was also conducted via static or 
dynamic panel models on a large sample of countries, but also via time series 
analysis. Brender and Drazen (2009) did not test for existence or statistical signi-
ficance of budgetary variables in election period rather whether opportunistic cre-
ation of cycles helps boost re-election chances for the incumbent with LOGIT 
regression.9 Also Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) use LOGIT regression but 
combine it with static panel analysis. Methodology, variables and conclusions of 
surveys are presented in table 2 in chronological order. First are listed surveys in 
transition countries and after them surveys for developing countries, also in chro-
nological order.  
5 research on political budget cycles  
  at the municipal level in croatia 
5.1 data
The model encompasses 21 cities (19 county centres plus the City of Zagreb and 
Pula) in time period from 2002 till 2011. In the observed time period 3 parliamen-
tary elections (2003, 2007 and 2011) and 2 local elections (2005 and 2009) were 
held, with all results calculated and shown at the municipal (local) levels. The 
sample encompasses all the county centres and the City of Zagreb, but instead of 
Pazin, in Istarska County, it includes Pula. Since Pula represents the economic, 
financial, cultural, transportation, health and educational hub of Istarska County, 
the choice was obvious. These 21 cities, out of the 33 that have taken over decen-
tralised functions, were selected because of their size and due to the fact that they 
are generators of trends in fiscal variables at the local level. Furthermore, the NPE 
is based on a Hamiltonian approach to political economy which emphasises not 
just the importance of economic incentives, but also of political constraints, in its 
analysis of economic outcomes. The latter are shown in the symbolic value of 
holding office in the selected cities for all political parties. From that, it clearly 
follows that political constraints will significantly influence economic outcomes.
Data used in the model come from Ministry of Finance local budget archives, the 
State Election Committee and the Croatian Bureau of Statistics. As the starting 
year of the analysis, 2002 was chosen, because it was the year when the fiscal 
decentralisation process started and local-level data became available. 
Dynamic panel regressions with dependent variables taken from local budgets are 
used in the model. Stated dependent variables in the model are:
1)  Budget balance (% of total revenues),
2)  Total expenditures (% of total revenues),
9 LOGIT or logistic regression is a special form of regression analysis in which the dependent variable is a 
binary variable (Hair et al., 1995:130). In survey conducted by Brender and Drazen (2008) dependent varia-
ble takes the value of 1 if incumbent remains in office and 0 otherwise. v
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15 3)  Current expenditures (% of total revenues),
4)  Other expenditures (% of total revenues),
5)  Capital expenditures (% of total revenues),
6)  Average number of employees in local bureaucracy (% of total population),
7)  Average number of employees in budgetary users (% of total population),
8)  Personnel expenses for local bureaucracy (% of total revenues),
9)  Personnel expenses for budgetary users (% of total revenues).
Model also includes 6 binary/dummy variables: 
1)  Election year (which takes the value of 1 in election year and 0 otherwise),
2)  Pre-election year (which takes the value of 1 in pre-election year and 0 
otherwise),
3)  Post-election year (which takes the value of 1 in post-election year and 0 
otherwise),
4)  Partisan  compatibility  between  national  and  local  incumbents  /IDEO/ 
(which takes the value of 1 if national and local incumbent share the same 
party membership and 0 otherwise),
5)  Margin (which takes the value of 1 if the percentage spread of votes recei-
ved by the electoral winner is less than 5% compared to the runner up and 0 
otherwise),
6)  Crises (which takes the value of 1 in the period 2009-2011 and 0 otherwise).
The paper shares and uses the assumption that elections take place every second 
year, as stated in theoretical PBC models of asymmetric information.10 The goal of 
the paper is to empirically test whether total expenditures and budget deficits in-
crease in an election period, i.e. is there an opportunistic cycle at the municipal 
level in Croatia.
The dummy variable IDEO is used to test whether partisan alliances at national 
and local level result in an increase of total expenditures in an election period. 
Results are compared to Naruhiko Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) who tested 
for a similar effect on fiscal variables in their paper. 
In accordance with Brender and Drazen (2009) the paper includes following con-
trol variables as an additional control of business cycle: GDP per capita and GDP 
gap.11 This is primarily due to the fact that the revenue side of the local budget 
depends on revenues from the central budget through shared taxes. As in Pette-
rsson-Lidbom (2000) we also add population as a final control variable. 
10 Having elections every two years follows from the assumption of incumbent’s competence, which follows the 
structure of the MA (1) process, meaning it lasts exactly two periods after which it needs to be signalised again.
11 GDP gap was calculated in EViews 7 with Hodrick-Prescott’s filter (l=100).v
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16 5.2 methodology
As a research method, dynamic panel data analysis is applied in economic rese-
arch in which the current value of a variable, for example, total expenditure bud-
get, depends on the previous values   of the same variable (Baltagi, 2008:135). 
Since autocorrelation is not included in the static panel model assumptions, the 
optimal choice is a dynamic panel model. Otherwise, the estimated parameters 
will be consistent, but inefficient, and the standard error of the estimated parame-
ters will be biased (Škrabić, 2009:28). The advantage of dynamic panel analysis is 
also reflected in its wider economic application. Using the dependent variable 
with one or more lags, regardless of whether the estimated coefficients are of di-
rect interest, significantly affects the consistent assessment of other parameters in 
the model (Bond, 2002). A dynamic panel model, which contains a dependent 
variable with t − 1 lag and K independent variables xitk, k = 1, ...K, is written as:
 yit = μ + γ yi,t-1 + β1xit1 + β2xit2  + βKxitK + αi + εit, i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ...T,  (1)
where N denotes the number of units of observation, T the number of periods, and       
xitk, k = 1, ...K denotes the value of k independent variables in period t. The para-
meter α is a random or fixed effect, and β1, ...βK parameters are exogenous varia-
bles to be estimated in the model. It is assumed that the idiosyncratic shocks εit are 
IID (0, σ 2
ε).
Since the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 is included in the model, it is correlated 
with the individual-specific effect α1. If the above model is estimated using least 
squares, OLS estimators of model parameters would be biased and inconsistent, 
even in the case where εit are mutually uncorrelated, random variables. Arellano 
and Bond (1991:277-297) propose a new GMM (generalized method of moments) 
estimator for dynamic panel models.12 Given this, the first difference of equation 
(1) can be written as follows:
yit − yi,t-1 = γ(yi,t-1 − yi,t-2 ) + β1(xit1 − xi,t-1,1) + β2(xit2 − xi,t-1,2)  
                 + βK(xitK − xi,t-1,K) + (εit − εi,t-1); i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ...T.  (2)
In order to ensure that parameter estimator of y was consistent in dynamic panel 
model  we  need  to  include  additional  instruments.  The  valid  instruments  for   
(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) are lagged values of the dependent variable in level (yi1, yi2,..., yi,t−2). 
Through the introduction of additional instruments for the independent variables, 
the GMM procedure solves the problem of endogenous variables and reverse cau-
sality. Valid instruments for values of independent variables in first differences   
(xi,t−1,k − xi,t−2,k), k = 1, 2, ..., K are lagged values of independent variables in level 
(xi1k, xi2k,..., xi,t−2,k), k = 1, 2, ..., K.
12 Arrelano-Bond estimator is optimal in the analysis of panel data, which are characterized by large N (num-
ber of units of observation) and small T (number of periods), as is the case in this paper.v
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17 Validity of chosen instruments for parameters estimation can be tested using the 
Sargan test. If a null hypothesis is accepted by the Sargan test it means that all 
chosen instruments are valid, that is, the dynamic panel model is adequately spe-
cified. Arellano and Bond (1991:282) developed two additional diagnostic tests 
for serial correlation: m1 and m2. The second-order autocorrelation in the differen-
ced residuals would imply that the estimates are inconsistent.
The advantage of using a two-step GMM estimator is because a one-step estima-
tion assumes the error terms to be independent and homoscedastic across coun-
tries and over time. A two-step estimator relaxes the assumption of independence 
and homoscedasticity by using the residuals obtained from the first step estimation 
to construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. Thus, when 
the error term εit is heteroscedastic the two step estimator is more efficient (Višić 
and Škrabić Perić, 2011:178).
When interpreting the model, special attention was given to the dummy variables 
and their estimated parameters β1, ...βK . In the first step, we are interested in whe-
ther they are statistically significant and at what levels of significance. In the se-
cond step, we are interested in the sign of their coefficient, i.e. whether the sign 
corresponds to the theoretical predictions stated in PBC models.
5.3 empirical results
The dynamic panel model used in the paper is written as follows:
BVit = α + γBVi,t-1 + β1GDP_PCit + β2GDP_GAPit + β3TOT_POPit  
          + β4IDEOit + β5ELE_YEARit + β5CRISESit + β5MARGINit + εit ,  (3)
where BVit represents one out of nine budget variables and BVi,t−1 the value of the 
dependent  variable  in  the  previous  period.  Control  variables  are:  GDP_PCit, 
GDP_GAPit and TOT_POPit, while the dummy variables IDEOit and ELE_YEARit 
are used in order to test the existence of ideological alliances and opportunistic 
cycles, respectively. In the sub-samples that examine local and parliamentary 
elections separately, the model was expanded by two additional dummy variables: 
ELE_YEAR (−1)it and ELE_YEAR (+1)it. The former represent the pre-election 
and latter the post-election year. Finally, the model also includes two dummy va-
riables: CRISESit and MARGINit .  
Nine different models are estimated in the paper using a two-step GMM Arellano 
Bond estimator. All calculations were made in the statistical program Stata/SE 11.
Appendix contains descriptive analysis together with the correlation matrix. At a 
5% significance level we see that the independent variables are not strongly cor-
related, which indicates that in the estimated models there are no problems of 
multicollinearity. Estimated models that test the existence of PBC are shown in 
tables 3-5.v
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Tax autonomy of cities is enabled because the total revenues of the majority of 
cities refer to tax revenues which again come mostly from taxes shared with the 
central government.13 Papers by Bajo and Jurlina Alibegović (2008) and Rogić 
Lugarić (2010) also confirm this statement. Accordingly the revenue side of the 
budget has not been analysed and all other budgetary variables are presented as a 
proportion of total revenue. The other two variables, the average number of em-
ployees in local bureaucracy and in budgetary users, are expressed as a percentage 
of total population in the city selected in the reference year.
Results presented in tables 3-5 indicate that all three diagnostic tests for the vali-
dity of the estimated dynamic models are satisfied. Based on the results of Sar-
gan’s test, we can conclude that the instruments used are well chosen. The basic 
premise of dynamic panel models and the Arellano-Bond estimator that there is no 
autocorrelation of error terms of the first and second row of the first differences of 
residuals is rejected only in the case of a second-order autocorrelation. This is the 
case only in the model with other expenditures and in the model with the average 
number of employees in budgetary users in table 3 at a 10% significance level and 
in the model with current expenditures and in the model with other expenditures 
in table 4 and table 5 at a 10% significance level.
Results of the dynamic panel analysis (table 3) indicate a rejection of the hypothe-
sis of the existence of PBC in the selected sample in the observed period. In the 
model with budget balance and in the model with total expenditures, the dummy 
variable election year is statistically significant, but the coefficient has a sign 
which is opposite to the theoretically expected one. That is, in election years the 
budget balance, on average, increases by 1.9% of total revenue, while total expen-
ditures, on average, decrease by 2.8% of total revenues.
Based on the obtained results, the selected Croatian cities cannot be classified into 
the paradigm set by the ‟old democracies”. Brender and Drazen (2004) obtained 
a negative coefficient for this group of countries and more importantly the coeffi-
cient was statistically insignificant. In accordance with Rose (2006), the results 
indicate that the opportunistic manipulation of fiscal instruments is determined by 
the institutional context within the budgetary process takes place. Limitations on 
borrowing at the local level in Croatia represent a confirmation of the findings of 
Bajo and Jurlina Alibegović (2008) and Primorac (2011). Therefore, these results 
indicate that budgetary constraints regarding public debt accumulation at the local 
level14 actually reduce the magnitude of opportunistically motivated PBC.15 The 
implications of this conclusion, at the national level, could potentially result in a 
13 In the selected sample the share of tax revenues in total revenues amounted up to 64-68% in the observed 
time period.
14 Government and the Ministry of Finance restrict local government borrowing up to 2.3% of total revenues 
of all local units (Bajo and Jurlina Alibegović, 2008:135).
15 Primorac (2011:461) states that cities can borrow through utility companies that are in their possession and 
thus circumvent institutional constraints specified in the Budget Law and the Law on State Budget Execution.v
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20 reduction of total expenditures in election years which is a point strongly advoca-
ted by the constitutional political economy. Furthermore, Vučković (2011) finds 
that the only statistically significant variable with the expected theoretical sign, at 
the consolidated central government level, is total expenditures. This raises a 
number of questions connected with the conduct of economic policy within such 
a context, the most important being the limited use of countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Descriptive analysis (figure 1) shows that capital expenditures have declined since 
2008 while personnel expenditures have increased or remained at the same level. 
In other words, fiscal policy was not used as a countercyclical instrument, rather 
it was a result of ‟state capture” and rent-seeking behaviour by the bureaucracy.
figure 1
Budget balance, current and capital expenditures (in billion kuna)
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Source: Calculated by author.
Econometric analysis also confirms that in election years capital expenditures de-
crease (on average by 1.4% of total revenues), while other expenditures (on ave-
rage by 0.9% of total revenue) and personnel expenditure for local bureaucracy 
(on average by 0.3% of total revenues) simultaneously increase. It follows that the 
manipulation of the structure of total expenditures serves as the second best stra-
tegy for the incumbent in election years. As in Schneider (2010) we find that in-
cumbents use this fiscal strategy, the only one remaining due to institutional con-
straints.
The relationship between budget balance and personnel expenditure for local 
  bureaucracy is shown in figure 2. It indicates that personnel expenditure grew 
continuously until 2009, regardless of whether the budget was balanced or not. 
Personnel expenditures declined in 2010, but in the year of the last parliamentary 
elections, 2011, they again increased. Throughout this period, the budget balance 
of selected cities was in surplus only in 2002 and in 2007. This indicates not only 
the fiscal irresponsibility of the political elite at the local level, but also to political 
economy issues in planning and implementing budgetary policies and the appa-v
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21 rent rent-seeking behaviour of the local bureaucracy. Apparently incumbents cal-
culate that this will provide them additional votes. Tullock (1987:1043) cites em-
pirical studies, which confirm the above. 
figure 2
Budget balance and personnel expenditure for local bureaucracy (in billion kuna)
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Econometric analysis shows that while in election years the average number of 
employees both in local bureaucracy (on average by 0.15% of total population) 
and in budgetary users (on average by 0.15% of total population) decreases, the 
personnel expenditure for local bureaucracy increases on average by 0.27% of 
total revenue. Also, the decline in personnel expenditure for budgetary users (on 
average by 0.56% of total revenue) with the concurrent increase in personnel ex-
penditure for local bureaucracy may be associated with incumbents’ distribution 
policies, according to Lowi’s typology of public policies (Petak, 2008:455). The 
increase in personnel expenditure for local bureaucracy apparently was financed 
by reducing other budget items. In this way, employees in local bureaucracy are 
protected and rewarded for their loyalty, while the salaries of employees in budget 
users are reduced. Employees in budget users, that is, particularly, in culture and 
education, are usually not politically reliable since their working place mandates 
certain professional knowledge that enables them to be free from the direct in-
fluence of the incumbent. The above coincides with the findings of Rogić Lugarić 
(2012:116-117) in a situation in which a budget surplus occurs in municipalities. 
Excess of revenue in the budget can be used to reduce existing taxes, to reduce 
debt or can be transferred to the next year and allocated to specific, mostly current, 
expenditure. Such a decision on the allocation of scarce resources is distributive 
and political. Drazen and Eslava (2005:22) also found a statistically significant 
increase in the personnel expenditures for permanent personnel, which reinforces 
the widespread belief that incumbents in Colombia trade jobs for political support 
and election votes.v
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22 Partisan compatibility between national and local incumbents, or variable IDEO, 
is statistically significant only in the case of the following variables: total expen-
ditures, other expenditures and capital expenditures. All three variables are stati-
stically significant even when we look at particular outcomes of parliamentary and 
local elections. Even their signs and the estimated coefficients are equal. A nega-
tive sign obtained for the variable total expenditure (a reduction, on average, by 
4.6% of total revenue) and capital expenditures (a reduction, on average, by 2.53% 
of total revenue) points to the following two conclusions. First, the movement of 
these variables is the opposite of the expected theoretical direction and the results 
do not coincide with those of Naruhiko Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) in the 
case of local elections in Brazil. Second, the resulting signs of coefficients are 
equal both for dummy variable Election year and IDEO, suggesting that partisan 
compatibility apparently does not play any role in the allocation/distribution of 
budget funds. As in Jurlina Alibegović et al. (2010) it is evident that the connec-
tions between central and local government units are primarily determined thro-
ugh decentralized functions and fiscal equalization model. With respect to the 
latter, Bajo and Bronić (2007), on a sample of 5% of cities and municipalities, and 
Bronić (2010), on a sample of counties, judge it inefficient, but in the identifica-
tion of reasons do not find any related to party affiliation.
In order to capture the potential benefits of pre-election manipulation, in a situa-
tion of uncertainty of election outcome, the model was augmented with an addi-
tional dummy variable – margin. The obtained results again indicate that the in-
cumbent turns to his second best strategy in that situation. Through restructuring 
items on the expenditure side of the budget, the incumbent, in the election year, on 
average,  reduces  current  expenditures  by  1.5%  of  total  revenue  and  simulta-
neously increases capital expenditures, on average, by 3.1% of total revenues. In 
other words, voters in these cities can expect an increase in capital investment, a 
reduction in current expenditures and no cycle in the budget balance. Khemani 
(2004) obtained identical results for local elections in 14 states in India. Also, the 
incumbent increases the average number of employees in the local bureaucracy, 
on average, by 0.03% of total population and the average number of employees in 
budgetary users, on average, by 0.06% of total population. This electoral mano-
euvre is ‟paid for” by a decrease in personnel expenditures for budgetary users in 
the amount of, on average, 0.6% of total revenues.
The dummy variable crisis unambiguously shows that in the period 2009-11 the 
budget balance deteriorated, on average, by 8.54% of total revenue. Total expen-
ditures in the reporting period increased, on average, by 10.04% of total revenue 
as a result of the increase in current expenditures, on average, by 8.46% of total 
revenue. Franić (2012) analysed employment at the local level in Croatia in the 
2008-11 period and found that the total number of employees that received wage 
from local and regional government increased by 15%. This increase was evident 
both in the absolute and the relative increase in the proportion of total expenditure. v
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23 Given that during this period new units were not established, and that no signifi-
cant progress in decentralization was made, which would have required new jobs, 
it is evident that this was a political-economy answer to unemployment issues on 
the labour market. The same trend is observed in our sample of cities. The model 
records an increase in the average number of employees in local bureaucracy, on 
average, by 0.17% of total population and an increase in the average number of 
employees in budgetary users, on average, by 0.39 % of total population. Also, 
personnel expenditures for local bureaucracy, on average, increase by 1.17% of 
total revenues and personnel expenditures for budgetary users, on average, incre-
ase by 1.9% of total revenues.
If local elections are analysed separately then the hypothesis on the existence of 
PBC is confirmed. As in Naruhiko Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011), we find that 
budget deficit increases, on average, by 4.45% of total revenues. The budget defi-
cit is also statistically significant in the pre-election and post-election year. In 
pre-election year, the budget deficit increases, on average, by 4.81% of total reve-
nue and in post-election year the budget deficit increases, on average, by 2.36% of 
total revenue. Rašić Bakarić et al. (2013), on a sample of 127 cities, and Bratić 
(2008), in an analysis of the decision-making processes on local budgets in Croa-
tia, conclude that political commitment does not affect the movement of budge-
tary variables. In other words, all politicians opportunistically manipulate budget 
items in order to ensure re-election.
In the model with total expenditures, there is a statistically significant increase in 
the pre-election (on average by 3.41% of total revenues) and the post-election year 
(on average by 2.06% of total revenues). In the composition of total expenditures, 
for all three selected periods, only other expenditures are statistically significant, 
decreasing, on average, by 1.65% of total revenues in the pre-election year.
Also, in each of the selected periods there is a statistically significant increase in 
variables that measure average numbers of employees in a local bureaucracy and 
in budgetary users with the most significant coefficients in a post-election year 
(0.105% and 0.296% of total population, respectively). In a situation in which the 
outcome of the elections is unclear, the dummy variable margin in the election 
year also confirms a statistically significant and positive coefficient of the mentio-
ned variables (0.034% and 0.052% of total revenues, respectively). The above 
mentioned phenomenon points to the incumbents’ motivation, which is for the 
incumbent to ensure political support in local elections by providing jobs to the 
electorate. Since the turnout in local elections is much lower than the turnout in 
the parliamentary elections (SEC, 2013) the marginal benefits of such a mano-
euvre are much larger. v
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28 The dummy variable margin indicates a decrease of personnel expenditures for 
local bureaucracy (on average, by 0.49% of total revenues) and for budgetary 
users (on average, by 1.15% of total revenues). At the same time, personnel ex-
penditures for a local bureaucracy, on average, decreases in each of the three pe-
riods, with the most significant coefficient in the post-election year (on average, 
by 0.66% of total revenues). On the other hand, personnel expenditures for bud-
getary users, in a pre-election year, showed a statistically significant increase, on 
average, by 1.07% of total revenues. Having all that in mind, one can conclude 
that in the case of local elections too there is a certain amount of restructuring 
among expenditure items in order to finance the increased number of personnel. 
The increase in ‟visible” expenditures (the average number of employees and 
personnel expenditures) in combination with an increase in the budget deficit re-
fers to the theoretical assumptions of Rogoff’s PBC model. 
Given the budget constraints that apply to the local level, incumbents are aware 
that the budget deficit created may be minimal as confirmed by the items that 
change in the election years (the average number of employees and personnel 
expenditures for the local bureaucracy). Thus, the legislator took a ‟weapon” from 
the incumbents’ hands at the local level, but did not manage to diminish their mo-
tives and their tendency to opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, the existence of 
budget constraints for borrowing de facto abolishes the distinction between com-
petent and incompetent incumbent. In the selected period, the average value of the 
budgetary balance (appendix, print out A1) indicates an average deficit in the 
observed time period, meaning that all incumbents take their toll in creating a 
deficit. The only question is how the incumbents restructure expenditure items 
and guess the preferences of the electorate.
Identical variables are statistically significant for the dummy variable crisis (SAL, 
UR, TC, ZPT, ZPK, RZT and RZK), as they were in the joint analysis of local and 
parliamentary elections. All estimated coefficients are positive and lower than 
  those estimated for the joint analysis, except for the coefficient related to perso-
nnel expenditures for local bureaucracy, which, on average, increases by 1.62% of 
total revenue. In addition, estimated coefficients have the same sign and size in 
both local and parliamentary elections. 
The variables SAL, ZPT, ZPK and RZT are statistically significant in the analysis 
of parliamentary elections, but they have opposite signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients in relation to the analysis of local elections. That is, budget deficit decrea-
ses, on average, by 4.45% of total revenue as well as the average number of em-
ployees in local bureaucracy (by 0.05% of the total population on average) and in 
budgetary users (by 0.15 % of the total population on average). The last two re-
sults are equivalent to those obtained in the joint sample, while the personnel 
  expenditure for local bureaucracy in the election year increases, on average, by 
0.65 %   of total revenue. In a pre-election year, the average number of employees v
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29 in the local bureaucracy and in budgetary users increases, while the budgetary 
deficit decreases. A post-election year records a statistically significant decrease in 
other expenditures and in the average number of employees in the local bureau-
cracy and budgetary users, with a simultaneous increase in personnel expenses for 
budgetary users. The signs and estimated coefficients on the dummy variables 
margin and crisis have exactly the same sign and size in both local and parliamen-
tary elections. 
6 conclusion
From the viewpoint of political economy, analysis of the informational, technical 
and political constraints faced by incumbents and by other participants in PCT is 
becoming increasingly relevant in an environment characterized by fiscal consoli-
dation. In accordance with Aristotle’s notion that man is ‟a political animal”, 
  ev  ery individual, directly or indirectly, creates an environment in which market 
and non-market activities take place. Therefore, any analysis of non-market deci-
sion making processes (such as decisions in the budget process) that ignores poli-
tical constraints is incomplete and inadequate. 
This paper investigates the relationship between PBC theory and its empirical 
implications on a sample of Croatian cities. The fiscal strategies of incumbents 
seeking re-election within the institutional constraints placed at the local level 
have also been analysed. The correlation between budget items in selected Croa-
tian cities (19 county centres, the City of Zagreb and Pula) with the election re-
sults in the period 2003-11 has been empirically tested. Dynamic panel models 
have been estimated using the Arellano and Bond two-step GMM estimator. The 
paper presents not only the empirical part but also various theoretical models of 
PBC as well as a review of empirical research on the existence of PBC in develo-
ped, transition and developing countries. A total of 27 econometric models in th-
ree different samples have been estimated. The first nine models were related to 
the joint analysis of the impact of local and parliamentary elections on budgetary 
variables in a selected sample of cities; the following nine on impacts of local 
elections and the last nine on impacts of the parliamentary elections. 
The results of dynamic panel analysis on the joint sample indicate a rejection of 
the hypothesis that opportunistic PBCs exist at the level of the observed Croatian 
cities. In election years, the budget deficit and total expenditures decrease as op-
posed to the theoretical assumptions of the model. Due to the institutional con-
straints on local level public borrowing incumbents manipulate the structure of 
total expenditure in order to maximize re-election. The results indicate that budget 
constraints on public borrowing result in a decrease of opportunistically motiva-
ted PBCs. This has important repercussions when applied to the level of consoli-
dated central government and consolidated general government.   v
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30 An increase in current expenditures (personnel expenditure for local bureaucracy 
and other expenditures) and a decrease in capital expenditures represents a second 
best strategy for incumbents. This underscores the rent-seeking role of the bureau-
cracy in the electoral process, which is consistent with Niskanen’s assumptions on 
the maximization of the bureaucrats’ budget. At the same time this represents a 
rational decision on behalf of incumbents, who count on a turnout of public ser-
vants in the elections that is high compared to the rest of electorate. In a situation 
in which the outcome of the election is uncertain, the estimated models suggest 
that incumbents increase the average number of employees in local bureaucracy 
and in budgetary users. In addition to that, there is an increase in capital expendi-
tures with a simultaneous reduction of current expenditures.
In the sample of parliamentary elections, the results of the analysis do not differ 
significantly from those obtained from the joint sample. The budget deficit redu-
ces in election years, while total expenditures are not statistically significant at 
standard levels of significance. Incumbents’ strategy in election years is marked 
by an increase in the average number of employees in local bureaucracy and in 
budgetary users, combined with a reduction in personnel expenditures. 
Confirmation of the hypothesis of the existence of opportunistic PBC’s at the level 
of observed Croatian cities was found in a sample analysing only local elections. 
Estimated coefficients in models with budget balance, average number of emplo-
yees in local bureaucracy and an average number of employees in budgetary users 
are statistically significant and in line with the theoretical predictions of Rogoff’s 
PBC model presented in chapter 3.
The results of the dynamic panel analysis in none of the three samples confirm the 
additional hypothesis that an increase of public expenditure follows when the in-
cumbents at the central and local level share the same party membership. Given 
that the central and local levels are connected via financing of the decentralized 
functions and through the fiscal equalization model, incumbents at the central le-
vel do not have any additional space for discretion in the election cycle.
The limitation of this study stems from the relatively short time series. Further-
more, a more complete analysis of the opportunistic motives of incumbents at   the 
local  level  should  include  utility  companies  owned  by  local  units  and  their 
  respective budget. It is through utility companies and their excessive short-term 
borrowing that the municipalities are able to circumvent budget constraints on 
public borrowing. The latter also represents a direction for future research. Also, 
according to the theoretical foundations of the model of an incumbent’s asymme-
tric preferences and the extreme fiscal centralization in Croatia, it would be inte-
resting to analyse the impact of spending from the central government budget 
targeted to specific social groups and/or geographical areas, and the results of 
elections at local and regional levels. v
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31 appendix
print out a1
Descriptive analysis 
. summarize   bdp_jaz   bdp_pc   br_stan   rnfi   rzk   rzt   sal   tc   tc_ost   ur   zpk   zpt
         Variable |         Obs          Mean      Std. Dev.   Min  Max
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          bdp_jaz |         210      5.80e-06  1.48e+07  -3.05e+07  2.07e+07
           bdp_pc |         210      55889.54  19930.38  27905.64  138195
           br_stan |         210      91873.93  160860.7  11832  793616
                 rnfi |         210      .2295255  .1035899  .0362604  .677106
                  rzk |         210      .1434883  .048639  0  .2378531
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  rzt |        210      .0787342  .0377541  0  .2968779
                  sal |        210     -.0153087  .0838408    -.2339418  .2229724
                    tc |         210      .7857832  .0865491     .4152943     .9790033
             tc_ost |         210      .1535218  .0713549     .0187538     .5186317
                   ur |         210      1.015309  .0838408     .7770276     1.233942
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 zpk |         210      .0056085  .003115  0     .0149832
                 zpt  |         210       .001921  .001066  0     .0066568
Source: Calculated by author.
print out a2
Correlation matrix (on 5% significance level)
. pwcorr  bdp_jaz  bdp_pc  br_stan  ideo  izb_god  izb_god__1_  izb_god__1_01 kriza  
margina  rnfi  rzk  rzt  sal  tc  tc_ost  ur  zpk  zpt,  star(5)
               |    bdp_jaz   bdp_pc   br_stan   ideo   izb_god   izb_g~1_   izb_g~01
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          bdp_jaz  |     1.0000  
           bdp_pc  |    -0.1743  *    1.0000  
           br_stan |    -0.0007     0.6933  *    1.0000 
                ideo   |    -0.0907    -0.2661  *   -0.1590  *    1.0000  
          izb_god   |     0.1218     0.0121    -0.0012     0.0042      1.0000  
 izb_god__1_  |     0.2694  *   -0.0904     0.0006     0.0042    -0.4286  *    1.0000 
izb_god__~01 |    -0.4331  *    0.0477     0.0006     0.0190    -0.3273  *   -0.3273  *    1.0000 
              kriza  |     0.4836  *    0.2090  *   -0.0031    -0.1621  *    0.0476     0.0476    -0.3273  *
         margina  |    -0.1873  *    0.0037    -0.0450     0.0942     0.2124  *   -0.2124  *   -0.1217 
                 rnfi  |    -0.3095  *   -0.0062    -0.0415     0.0986    -0.0858    -0.1245     0.2160  *
                 rzk  |     0.0874     0.1149    -0.0856    -0.0843     0.0257    -0.1797  *    0.0591 
                  rzt  |     0.2156  *   -0.1055    -0.1412  *    0.0005     0.0727     0.0495    -0.0948 
                  sal  |     0.0393    -0.0262     0.0184     0.0392     0.1707  *    0.0851    -0.1483  *
                   tc  |     0.3324  *    0.0328     0.0318    -0.1560  *   -0.0627     0.0666    -0.1149 
             tc_ost  |    -0.0996     0.0689    -0.0713     0.0040     0.0220    -0.0184    -0.0387 
                   ur  |    -0.0393     0.0262    -0.0184    -0.0392    -0.1707  *   -0.0851     0.1483  *
                 zpk  |    -0.3643  *    0.3172  *    0.1675  *   -0.0234    -0.3391  *    0.1210     0.1117 
                  zpt   |    -0.3186  *    0.3861  *    0.2391  *    0.0255    -0.3687  *    0.1662  *    0.1043 
               |      kriza    margina       rnfi        rzk        rzt        sal         tc
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              kriza  |     1.0000 
          margina |     0.0000     1.0000 
                 rnfi |    -0.3008  *   -0.0258     1.0000 
                 rzk  |     0.3994  *   -0.0203    -0.1004     1.0000 
                  rzt |     0.1116    -0.0298    -0.0395    -0.2065  *    1.0000 
                  sal |    -0.0301     0.0636    -0.5912  *   -0.0883    -0.1959  *    1.0000 
                    tc |     0.3892  *   -0.0308    -0.6242  *    0.2057  *   0.2370  *   -0.2611  *    1.0000 
             tc_ost |     0.0041     0.0670    -0.1634  *   -0.2424  *   -0.1447  *   -0.0390     0.2333  *
                   ur |     0.0301    -0.0636     0.5912  *    0.0883     0.1959  *   -1.0000     0.2611  *
                 zpk |    -0.1948  *    0.0357     0.1179    -0.0526    -0.1997  *   -0.0053    -0.1360  *
                 zpt  |    -0.1616  *    0.0318     0.1140    -0.1044     0.0458    -0.0599    -0.0784 
               |     tc_ost         ur        zpk        zpt
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------
             tc_ost |     1.0000 
                   ur |     0.0390     1.0000 
                 zpk |     0.1236     0.0053     1.0000 
                  zpt |    -0.0246     0.0599     0.6653  *    1.0000 
Source: Calculated by author.v
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